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Abstract 
Purpose 
Hostage and crisis negotiators serve a vital function within society by resolving hostage/crisis 
incidents.  This role, performed by specially trained police ‘volunteers’ helps to prevent 
numerous fatalities, and forms an important part of the modern policing repertoire.  There is 
limited research that identifies the experiences of police officers that dedicate their lives to 
saving others by volunteering in this capacity.  The current research, therefore, provides an 
insight into this fundamental police role using negotiator’s personal narratives.   
Design/methodology/approach 
This study consisted of an exploratory qualitative grounded theoretical analysis of semi-
structured interviews conducted with 15 negotiators from nine English police forces.   
Findings 
The analysis revealed three primary, seven secondary and 23 tertiary categories that form a 
conceptual model of the negotiator experience.  The three primary categories consisted of 
‘negotiator positives’, ‘negotiator negatives’ and ‘negotiator ambivalences’, which provide an 
insight into the experiences and identities of negotiators in England.   
Practical implications 
The findings identify several positive factors that could be used to market the role more 
effectively within police forces and enhance future recruitment processes.  Equally, the 
findings highlight several operational and organisational issues that have a negative impact on 
the negotiator experience.  The findings are, therefore, discussed in light of the practical 
implications for negotiator training/continuing professional development, policy and practice. 
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Originality/value 
This paper depicts the findings from one of the first qualitative analyses of negotiator 
experiences and provides a unique insight into the negotiator role from an Anglo-centric 
perspective.  
Keywords  
Hostage and crisis negotiation, crisis negotiation, police negotiators, crisis negotiators, 
grounded theory, police officer experiences. 
Paper type 
Research paper. 
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Introduction 
Police Culture and Identity 
As an entity, policing is garnering much public and political interest due to the ever-
changing ‘terrain’ that officers are being exposed to and the pressure to maintain standards 
whilst simultaneously dealing with budget cuts and increasing demand for policing response.  
In light of these pressures, policing is an area that has been heavily researched due to its unique 
and challenging nature, with researchers attempting to understand the policing context and the 
cultural parameters that surround the policing environment.  The majority of this research has 
tended to focus on policing in the isolated context of the police occupational role, with an 
emphasis on police officer performance and on-duty conduct (House, 2013).  There is a 
plethora of research that discusses the existence of a ‘police culture’ (Bayley and Bitner, 1984; 
Chan, 1996; Cochran and Bromley, 2003; Crank, 1998; Farkas and Manning, 1997; Fielding, 
1988; Kappeler et al., 1994) from a variety of perspectives, including reference to the fairly 
interchangeable concepts of ‘cop culture’ (Reiner, 2010); ‘police sub-culture’ (Waddington, 
1999) and the ‘police mind’ (Fielding and Fielding, 1991).  In a broad sense, police culture 
refers to a police officer’s attitudes, behaviour and work ethic (Scaramella et al., 2011) that are 
specific to a policing context and are thought to be instilled/reinforced as a result of 
organisational socialisation.   
Research has also identified the existence of ‘sub-cultures’ within police organisations 
that have been generated on the basis of ‘distinct experiences associated with specific structural 
positions’ (Reiner, 2000, p. 116) including police force, rank level and specialised department 
(Alderson, 1979; Chan, 1996; Reiner, 2000).  Reuss-Ianni (1983), for example, identified 
different types of police sub-culture amongst what he referred to as “management cops” and 
“street cops” whereby “different aspects of the overall social world of the police are given 
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different inflections depending on one’s rank” (Herbert, 1998, p. 344-345).  Police officers 
have also been broadly differentiated on the basis of “type of officer” (Brown, 1981; Muir, 
1977; Reiner, 1978); whereby different officer groups (and their associated sub-cultures) have 
been identified based on their dominant attitudes toward the public and police work (i.e. the 
extent to which they are connected to the public, are willing to embrace the use of coercive 
force, and their endorsement of an ethos of adventure and danger) (Herbert, 1998).   
Research relating to the experiences and potential sub-cultures associated with 
specialist roles is less abundant, and the potential impact of specific roles on police officer 
identity is not currently understood.  It is unclear, for example, whether specialist roles (i.e. 
firearms, dog handling, criminal investigation department (CID), hostage and crisis negotiation 
(HCNn), etc.) generate different meanings for police officers as a result of their specific 
nature/context.  The extant research in this area has tended to originate from the United States, 
with limited research having been carried out into police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
teams.  Kraska and Paulsen (1997), for example, studied Police Paramilitary Units (PPUs) 
(known as SWAT teams in common parlance) and identified a number of cultural themes that 
were unique to these specialised police units.  Themes included the existence of a distinct 
militaristic culture, a preoccupation with danger, pleasure in engaging with paramilitary 
activities, and a perception of PPUs as an “elite” form of police.   Other research has focused 
on team dynamics and the impact of team implicit coordination on SWAT team performance 
(Marques-Quintero, Curral, Passos, & Lewis, 2013) and the experiences of female SWAT team 
members (Dodge, Valcor, & Gomez, 2011), however, there is very little research dedicated to 
understanding other specialist police units/teams.  More recently, work by Young, Hennginton 
and Eggleston (2018) has focused on trying to identify competencies of SWAT personnel by 
exploring personality traits, cognitive emotion regulation styles and decision-making styles of 
SWAT officers, HCNs and patrol officers across the United States, providing insight into the 
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characteristics of officers that perform specialist roles from a quantitative perspective.  
However, to the authors’ knowledge, there has been no research conducted that explores the 
experiences of police officers who are trained as hostage and crisis negotiators (HCNs) and the 
meaning assigned to this role from a personal and professional perspective.   
Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Research Contextualised 
The majority of HCNs in England are police officers who perform this role in a 
voluntary capacity, alongside their day-to-day role.  Whilst these officers perform negotiation 
as an adjunct role, they constitute part of a highly specialised team, having completed an 
intensive set of training to equip them to respond to a spectrum of incidents ranging from 
suicidal individuals to kidnap and extortion cases (see Grubb, 2016; Grubb, Brown, Hall, & 
Bowen, 2019a).  Police officers who apply to become HCNs often have to meet extensive 
selection criteria (which varies from country to country) and have to complete a rigorous 
assessment and training process in order to qualify as operational HCNs (see Grubb, 2016; 
Grubb, Brown, Hall, & Bowen, 2018).  Within the UK, there is a small delegation of officers 
who are employed as police HCNs on a full time basis within the Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiation Units (based in Police Scotland, the Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester 
Police), however, the vast majority of HCNs operate on a rotational on-call basis, whereby they 
are on call for a period of one week in five (or six) depending on the size of the HCN cadre 
within the force.  When on call, they can be deployed at any point, day or night, which often 
involves working long and unsociable hours.  They frequently encounter situations that involve 
high levels of risk and potential for harm to themselves and others.  As such, the HCN role is 
one that requires dedication, resilience and commitment, and it is prudent to suggest that a role 
that frequently involves situations where life hangs in the balance is likely to contribute to the 
identity of the police officers that perform this role.     
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Research focused on the discipline of HCNn has adopted a variety of perspectives, with 
the majority of work being dedicated to understanding the communicative techniques that can 
be used to de-escalate crisis situations and help to resolve hostage/crisis scenarios peacefully.  
Authors (constituting both academics and practitioners alike) have developed a variety of 
models to guide HCN practice in theatre.  These models include (amongst others): the STEPS 
model (Kelln and McMurtry, 2007); the four-phase model of hostage negotiation (Madrigal et 
al., 2009); the Behavioral Change Stairway Model (BCSM) (Vecchi et al., 2005); and the 
Behavioral Influence Stairway Model (BISM) (Van Hasselt et al., 2008; Vecchi, 2009; Vecchi 
et al., 2005); the S.A.F.E. model for resolving hostage and crisis incidents (Hammer, 2007); 
the cylindrical model of crisis communications (Taylor, 2002); and the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model 
of hostage and crisis negotiation (Grubb, 2016).  These models have informed the training of 
HCNs internationally, with most emphasis being placed on the BCSM which was initially 
developed by the Crisis Negotiation Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBICNU) 
(Vecchi et al., 2005) and the BISM (Van Hasselt et al., 2008; Vecchi, 2009; Vecchi et al., 
2005).  These models have undoubtedly provided a means of operational support to HCNs all 
over the world, providing insight into effective crisis communication strategies and techniques 
that when applied appropriately enhance the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to a 
hostage/crisis incident.   
Whilst research in this domain has tended to focus on understanding the strategies, 
styles and techniques used by HCNs and models of HCNn have been developed to guide HCN 
practice (see Grubb, 2010), there is a lack of research into the experiences of HCNs in terms 
of their specialist role and being part of a HCN cadre.  The authors assert that the conditions 
under which HCNs are placed whilst being thrust into a potentially chaotic and life-threatening 
hostage or crisis situation may result in the development of a unique sub-culture for those 
officers involved.  The high-profile nature and competitiveness involved in joining a HCN team 
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has been described by Vecchi (2002, p. 2) in the United States (US) as resulting in “team 
members who have a high degree of solidarity, confidence, and esprit-de-corps for their unit” 
especially when placed in the context of a shared team-related culture and perspectives, 
however, it would appear that this is an anecdotally informed opinion as opposed to a specific 
empirically-derived research finding.  It is also unclear whether this assertion holds true for 
HCNs based outside of the US, as Vecchi’s analysis is undoubtedly based on his own 
experience as a FBI HCN.  Apart from this brief reference to the team dynamics associated 
with the HCN role, the authors have been unable to locate any published research that addresses 
the experiences of HCNs or the impact of this specialist police role on police officer identity.  
In addition to this void within the literature, there is no research to date that empirically 
explores the HCN organisational set up and operational experiences of HCNs in England or 
maps out best practice/areas for improvement from a research-informed context.  The current 
study provides a formal forum for HCN experiences to directly inform practice and to develop 
recommendations for changes to policy/practice on the basis of common experiences 
encountered by English HCNs, thereby generating an opportunity for research to directly 
inform policing practice in the future.  
The aim of the current study was therefore to address these gaps in the literature base 
by analysing the experiences of operationally active HCNs from a variety of metropolitan and 
rural police forces in England.  The findings will have direct relevance for the discipline by 
helping to understand what it means to be a HCN, highlighting areas of good practice and areas 
for improvement, and building a picture of the Anglo-centric HCN experience through the eyes 
of those who perform this unique and specialist role.  The specific objectives of the study were: 
1) to develop a model of HCNn by providing an insight into the experiences of English HCNs, 
and 2) to make recommendations for changes in HCNn policy/practice.  The specific research 
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questions addressed were: 1) what is it like to be a HCN in England? 2) what types of 
experiences do HCNs have? and 3) does being a HCN impact on a police officer’s identity?  
Method 
Design 
This study utilised a qualitative research design which consisted of the qualitative 
analysis of data gathered during semi-structured interviews with 15 operationally active HCNs.  
The data obtained from the interviews were analysed using the process of Grounded Theory, 
whereby categories of meaning were progressively identified, refined and integrated using 
initial and focused coding in order to develop a theory that is grounded in the data (as directed 
by Charmaz, 2006). 
Participants 
Interviewees consisted of a sub-sample of participants who took part in an earlier 
quantitative phase of the research (see Grubb, 2016; Grubb, Brown, & Hall, 2015, 2017).  
Purposive sampling (in the form of maximum variation sampling (Patton, 1990)) was used to 
identify 15 HCNs that were most relevant for the progress of data collection/development of 
theory (Morse, 2007) and demonstrated a wide range of HCN perspectives (as advocated by 
Cohen and Crabtree, 2006).  Interviewees consisted of 10 male and 5 female HCNs between 
the ages of 41 and 54 from nine English police forces (six rural/three metropolitan).  Seven of 
the participants were currently performing Criminal Investigation Department (CID) roles and 
eight of the participants were from uniformed policing roles, with represented ranks varying 
from Sergeant to Superintendent.  Nine of the interviewees had completed both the regional 
and national negotiator training courses, three had completed only the regional training course 
and three had completed only the national training course.  Seven of the interviewees were 
trained as HNCs, 13 were red centre trained (to respond to kidnap and extortion cases) and two 
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were qualified as Gold Negotiator Advisors.  HCN length of experience ranged from 24-195 
months, with interviewees reporting having responded to between 8-200 incidents.  
Throughout the results section, each interviewee is depicted by an alphanumerical code which 
represents their interview letter, gender, force number and length of service in months as a 
HCN (i.e., A:M:1:156 refers to Interview A; Male HCN; Force Number 1; and 156 Months of 
Service as a HCN) as a means of contextualising the excerpts presented.  
Measures 
Demographic questionnaire.  Participants completed questions relating to their age, 
gender, ethnicity, force, rank, current position/role, length of service as a police officer, HCN 
training/qualification levels, length of service as a HCN and number of incidents dealt with as 
a HCN. 
Semi-structured interview schedule.  The interview schedule was initially developed 
by the first author on the basis of the gaps within the existing literature base relating to HCNn.  
The overarching research questions generated by the literature review were used to guide the 
broad areas of interview coverage and to identify specific questions.  The initial interview 
schedule was then refined further by discussions with the other authors.  The final interview 
schedule devised by the researchers broadly focused on seven areas that were identified as 
lacking in coverage within the extant negotiation literature (i.e. recruitment and selection, 
training and continuing professional development (CPD), operational experiences, decision-
making, strategies/techniques and skills utilised, and support structures available to/utilised by 
HCNs).  After the initial interview, minor changes were made to the interview schedule to 
enhance overall flow of the questions and to add additional questions that related to content 
generated within the initial interview (i.e. within the first interview, the interviewee freely 
discussed his motivations for performing the role and quite passionately described the benefits 
he obtained from being a HCN; as such, additional questions were incorporated to address the 
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motivations behind becoming a negotiator).  The current paper reports on the findings relating 
specifically to discussions around operational experiences and decision-making processes 
during HCN deployment, as these narratives generated the categories used to develop the HCN 
experience model.  Exemplar interview questions included “Can you describe the most recent 
incident that you have been involved in?  What happened?  How did you respond and what 
was the outcome?”; “What are the decision-making processes involved in negotiating crisis 
incidents?”; “What are the potential problems that you encounter when negotiating?”; “What 
do you get out of your role as a negotiator?” and “Why do you do it?” 
Procedure 
Ethical approval was sought and gained from the Coventry University ethics committee 
prior to data collection and permission was granted by each Force Lead Hostage Negotiator 
Coordinator (HNC).  All interviews were carried out at the HCN’s place of work and lasted 
between 45-130 minutes (with a mean interview length of 87 minutes).  The interviews were 
orthographically transcribed by an external transcription company and transcripts were emailed 
to each interviewee for veracity verification and sanitisation prior to data analysis.   
Analysis 
Data were coded by hand in line with a grounded theory constructivist framework.  
Open coding in the form of line-by-line coding was completed on the entire set of transcripts 
in chronological order.  Using the constant comparative method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), 
and comparing the data across the transcripts, the identified concepts were then further refined 
into broad level tentative categories that provided meaning to the data.  Open coding was 
performed in parallel with memoing (Flick, 2009; Lempert, 2007) and clustering (Charmaz, 
2006; Rico, 1983) techniques in order to group similar concepts into categories (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990).  Focused coding was used to refine the three hundred and twenty concepts 
initially identified into more directed, selective and conceptual categories (Glaser, 1978), 
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resulting in the development of the following unique five micro-models: 1) The nature and 
characteristics of hostage and crisis negotiation model; 2) The hostage and crisis negotiator 
journey model; 3) The hostage and crisis negotiator experience model; 4) The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. 
model of hostage and crisis negotiation; and 5) The self-perceived successful hostage and crisis 
negotiator model.  The current paper addresses the findings relating to the third micro-model 
listed above.  Please refer to Grubb (2016), Grubb et al. (2018), and Grubb, Brown, Hall, and 
Bowen (2019a, 2019b) for findings relating to the other micro-models. 
By identifying the most significant and/or frequently occurring categories that made the 
most analytic sense (Charmaz, 2006), focused coding refined the 51 initial broad 
categories/concepts that related to the current model being discussed into three primary, seven 
secondary, and 23 tertiary categories (please see Table 1).  Coding was completed once the 
cross-comparative process demonstrated saturation of data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and no 
further concepts or categories were identified.  Axial coding was used to identify how the 
categories related to one another in a hierarchical sense and conceptual maps/diagrams were 
used to help integrate categories and to produce substantive theory (as suggested by Clarke 
(2003, 2005)).     
Results 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Negotiation positives.  The first primary category relates to the positive aspects of the 
role, which were divided into two secondary categories: ‘The negotiator family’ and 
‘Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding’, each of which was further divided 
into tertiary categories as outlined below.   
The negotiator family.  The language HCNs used suggests that the cadre acts or 
operates as a family, with HCNs feeling heavily supported by other team members.  The cadre 
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was portrayed as a small, closely-knit group that has a strong team ethos.  HCNn was 
conceptualised throughout the interviews as a team discipline, reliant on effective teamwork to 
be successful.  Three tertiary subcategories emerged, bearing some resemblance to the concept 
of the “tribe” referred to by Junger (2016) whereby a group offers strength and support, 
particularly to those within the military or emergency services. 
The cadre as supportive.  Most interviewees [n = 9] described feeling supported by 
other HCNs and portrayed an environment whereby they “watch each other’s back” 
(G:M:4:123).  This was particularly apparent when they experienced negative outcomes and 
was viewed as a vital coping mechanism that enabled them to deal with the trauma associated 
with fatalities: “…when we’ve had people die… people who’ve jumped, or committed suicide, 
or hung themselves… we support each other and we kick in and everyone checks everyone’s 
ok…” (B:M:2:195). 
Camaraderie and comradeship.  Camaraderie is defined as a form of “mutual trust and 
friendship among people who spend a lot of time together” (Camaraderie n.d.).  Described by 
most interviewees [n = 9], it was highlighted as a positive and important component: “…we’re 
quite a close bunch… you work with the same team… and you tend to link in with those quite 
closely… we know each other quite well… we’re all pretty much friends, really (F:M:4:111).  
One interviewee’s narrative epitomised this by suggesting that the team ethos served to 
supersede the rank structure of the police (i.e. a metaphorical removal of epaulettes) and 
enabled all team members to be viewed on an equal (and somewhat unique) footing. 
…we all have an equal say.  Rank doesn’t exist… we’re all first names.  There’s a… 
chief super sitting in there… couple of superintendents, chief inspectors, inspectors and 
we’re all on first name terms and we will all react to support whoever... And that’s quite 
unique within this organisation (G:M:4:123).  
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Negotiation as a team discipline.  HCNn was consistently portrayed [n = 9] as a 
discipline that would not function without the support of team members.  The importance of 
teamwork was both highlighted as the bedrock of HCNn and conceptualised as a positive aspect 
of the role.   
One of the first things they say on your national course is this… ‘have we got any 
individuals here?’  If we’ve got any individuals, you might as well get up and leave, 
because it’s not about you; it’s about the team thing (C:F:2:96). 
Team members played a number of roles that included supporting the primary HCN to ensure 
his/her welfare: “…making sure people have got drinks, people have got something to eat, 
people are warm enough; do they need a break?” (C:F:2:96), and providing suggestions for 
how the primary HCN might approach the next part of the negotiation.  Some interviewees [n 
= 4], for example, described a form of reflective working whereby they would often bounce 
ideas off each other in order to direct the negotiation effectively: “…it’s quite useful, because 
you’ve got the team round you, so you come off the phone, and you’ve had someone who’s… 
been making a note of what’s been said, right, where are we?  And you have that team 
discussion…” (J:F:6:110). 
Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding.  The perceived 
personal/professional rewards could be clearly categorised into four secondary categories, as 
described below. 
Negotiation as challenging.  HCNn was conceptualised by some interviewees [n = 5] 
as being rewarding as a result of providing an intellectual challenge.  One interviewee described 
HCNn as a “constant battle of wits” (G:M:4:123) that he found personally rewarding, whereas 
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another referred to enjoyment obtained from trying to form a relationship with a subject1 that 
often posed a challenge:   
…trying to find that little thing that’s going to give you some kind of rapport… with 
somebody who you otherwise might have nothing… in common with at all… the 
challenge I actually enjoy is… finding that thing that you can both talk about… 
(F:M:4:111). 
Opportunity for public interface and interaction was perceived as rewarding for 
interviewees who were in roles with limited public interface [n = 6].  The role was described 
by one senior-ranking HCN as an opportunity for him to be “down the coalface” (A:M:1:156) 
and get involved with “hands on policing”.  Whereas another referred to the opportunity to 
remain ‘in touch’ with the public:   
...as a PC you will go to people in lots of different crises...  I don’t get to those jobs.  So 
what it personally gives me is the reminder of how to speak to people, how not to speak 
to people and just that snapshot into what is reality for their life (I:M:6:84). 
Negotiation as emotionally rewarding.  Most interviewees [n = 8] experienced a variety 
of positive emotions, often referring to feelings of excitement and thrill.  One described a 
“massive high” and “great feeling” (A:M:1:156); whereas others described the “adrenalin rush” 
(J:F:6:110) or “elation” (O:F:9:36; H:F:5:50) felt when an incident had been successfully 
resolved.  These findings suggest that there is an element of thrill-seeking involved that is likely 
to be due to the high stakes/risk scenarios to which HCNs are often deployed.  The input of a 
HCN may be pivotal in whether a person lives or dies, and as such is likely to evoke a number 
of emotions: “…it was quite exciting to feel that you’re part of something that big… if you 
                                                          
1 The term “subject” is utilised to refer to either a “hostage-taker” or “individual-in-crisis”, depending on the 
context of the hostage or crisis situation being referred to. 
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asked us all to be totally honest, there is that element of thrill.  And buzz.  And adrenalin rush 
that comes with it…” (G:M:4:123).  One interviewee even went so far as to describe the 
emotions experienced as unique to the discipline:   
…when you’re a police officer, and you’re arresting people, and you’re putting them in 
court, it’s a nice feeling and you think, great, I’ve done a good job today.  But when 
you actually can say, genuinely you’ve saved somebody’s life, it’s like a whole new 
level, so it’s a buzz that you can’t get in any other area of business I don’t think… You 
get a fantastic buzz from it, it’s so unique, that there’s nothing that can compare to it, 
nothing, in the police service (L:M:7:54). 
Feeling good from helping others was consistently referred to by interviewees: “I 
always get a tremendous sense of achievement… that I’ve really made a difference to that 
person at that moment in time” (B:M:2:195).  The main intention was to help people in 
crisis/conflict and to resolve hostage/crisis situations, however, in doing so, HCNs also 
experienced personal reward in the form of positive emotions.  This phenomenon is well 
established within the counselling literature and is described as the “helpers high” (Luks, 1988).  
Negotiating may, therefore, serve to provide some form of longer term positive impact on 
HCNs’ self-esteem, egos and identities, particularly as most interviewees [n = 10] described 
experiencing this in some shape or form “…there have been times when I’ve come away and 
thought, I think I have saved someone’s life today… and that is such a wonderful feeling…” 
(J:F:6:110). 
Negotiation negatives.  The second primary category that emerged related to negative 
components, which were categorised into three secondary categories: ‘Operational issues’, 
‘Organisational issues’ and ‘Personal Sacrifices’.  Each secondary category was further 
subdivided into smaller tertiary subcategories that are described below.     
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Operational issues refer to the difficulties experienced while physically negotiating at 
a scene, which were categorised into four tertiary categories: ‘Operational rank/role conflict’, 
‘Negotiating solo’, ‘Lack of operational discipline’ and ‘Competing tactical orientations’. 
Operational rank/role conflict.  HCNs have to work closely with tactical teams and the 
commanders on the ground to successfully resolve incidents.  They are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining contact with the subject with the intention of de-escalating the 
subject’s emotional state and resolving the crisis situation, whereas the tactical teams are 
responsible for ensuring the HCNs’ safety and implementing a tactical response if required.  
The on-scene commander is responsible for making the decisions that oversee the whole police 
operation.  This includes establishing perimeters and traffic control, directing the activity of 
the HCNs, deploying tactical teams and liaising with emergency services (Miller, 2015). 
Various forms of operational rank/role conflict were reported by some interviewees [n 
= 7].  Although the basic premise is that “negotiators negotiate and commanders command” 
(A:M:1:156; D:M:3:63), conflict often arose as a result of dual roles and a lack of clear and 
enforceable boundaries in relation to these roles.   
…as soon as I rock up, someone says, thank God you’re here boss and what do I do?  
Well hold on, I’m not the ground commander, I’m the negotiator; I work for you in 
these circumstances… there is this… role, rank issue (G:M:4:123).   
The majority of conflicts described appeared to have arisen due to rank/role issues.  As HCNs 
have historically “negotiated at rank” (i.e. HCNs need to be of Sergeant/Inspector rank), this 
means that on many occasions, the silver commander at the scene will actually be of a lower 
rank than the HCN.  Interviewees [n = 4] reported that commanders often expected HCNs (of 
higher rank than themselves) to make command decisions, thereby resulting in conflict: “I’m 
an inspector.  I could turn up at an incident being run by a sergeant, and he or she would then 
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look to me to then command the incident… and it’s just not helpful…” (D:M:3:63).  This 
rank/role conflict appears to be double sided, however, as other interviewees [n = 3] described 
conflict experienced as a result of senior ranking officers taking on command roles/making 
command decisions despite being deployed in a HCN capacity:  
Who’s silver command?  Sergeant so and so.  Right.  So he or she is in command.  
We’ve got some negotiators in this force who just don’t get that… They make command 
decisions… It’s just down to you as an individual really... I make it quite clear and 
always have done.  That I’m there to negotiate (B:M:2:195). 
Lack of operational discipline was also described by most interviewees [n = 11], in 
terms of colleagues not behaving appropriately on scene.  Two forms of disciplinary issues 
were identified.  Firstly, some [n = 5] referred to incidents when police officers behaved 
unprofessionally by saying or doing things that were not appropriate, or wanted to get involved 
with the negotiation:  “…it may be that they [the subject] pick up on stuff from… police officers 
on the cordon who maybe aren’t as… careful as they should be about what they say or do” 
(K:M:2:111).  Secondly, most interviewees [n = 10] made reference to the problems associated 
with a lack of effective scene control: “…poor self-discipline… it’s supposed to be in a sterile, 
quiet room, and you are talking and other people are chipping in or pissing around…” 
(C:F:2:96).  Sterility in this sense refers to ensuring that the subject is only communicating 
with the HCN(s), which is important as the involvement of third parties was highlighted as 
exacerbating the crisis situation and increasing risk of harm to the subject and/or 
hostages/victims.   
...ones where you’re trying to negotiate with someone, but we haven’t created a sterile 
environment, and we’ve got a load of people from the estate that are also talking to him 
on the roof, and we haven’t got the cordons up properly.  That’s a nightmare, and that 
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is where it really can go horribly wrong, because… you’re speaking to them at the front 
of the house on the roof, their mates are speaking to… them, at the back of the house, 
and they’re telling him to jump.  And we’re telling him to stay up there (A:M:1:156). 
Competing tactical orientations was identified as the third operational issue, whereby 
conflict was created between ‘play-it-long’ HCNs and ‘tactically minded’ commanders who 
were keen to get the situation resolved as quickly as possible.  HCNs are trained to utilise time 
as a tactic and to “play the long game” (F:M:4:111) to allow subjects’ emotional arousal levels 
to decrease; however, commanders are often concerned with the potential impact of a long 
police operation on police/public costs.  A similar form of operational conflict (i.e. “a unique 
conflict triangle” between the on-scene commander, SWAT commander and HCN 
commander) was identified by Vecchi (2002, p. 3) in the USA; and Norton and Petz (2012, 
p.31) refer to the pressure exerted by tactical teams on HCNs to “wrap this up one way or 
another”, suggesting that this is an issue that afflicts other HCN teams.  Examples of such 
conflict were described by most interviewees [n = 10]: “…sometimes there will be increasing 
pressure for the negotiators to be used and then withdrawn, because commanders want to get 
the situation resolved quickly” (A:M:1:156); and these opposing ethea sometimes resulted in 
on-scene conflict, as demonstrated by the following incident.  
…we negotiated him, talked to him over a period of two or three hours and got him 
down to the steps… so he was… fifteen feet above us… then … a colleague… who 
was... the silver commander...  suddenly disappeared having been there getting quite 
frustrated at how slow we were at getting this bloke off the bridge.  He came back and 
he’d been… to put on a harness with all the ropes from the fire brigade... and just 
suddenly started going up the steps to grab this bloke.  He said, ‘if you don’t come 
down, I’m coming to get you’... the bloke decided to climb back up onto the bridge.  So 
it took us another forty-five minutes to get him back again (B:M:2:195). 
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Negotiating solo.  Protocol dictates that HCNs should never negotiate on their own, and 
this concept was identified early on within the literature (i.e. Fuselier, 1981, p. 13); however, 
due to logistical difficulties, it is often the case that HCNs attend an incident (or respond via 
telephone) on their own during the initial stages of deployment: “Quite often, you’d be there 
on your own for quite some time before another one turned up” (K:M:2:111).  Having to 
negotiate with a subject without any support (or a “number 2”) was described by some [n = 5] 
as a negative experience that goes against the grain of the team ethos and resulted in HCNs 
experiencing stress due to feeling isolated: “…that’s… where your back up is needed.  Because 
I have been on my own quite a bit… it is, that immense, you’re thinking everything is on me” 
(H:F:5:50); “And I was on my own… That was really hard… you could feel your stress level 
rising, because I’m thinking… where’s my support? (C:F:2:96).   
Organisational issues.  Issues that HCNs experienced as a result of organisational 
structure, policies or procedures were categorised into four tertiary categories: ‘Dual role 
conflict’, ‘Lack of awareness and support within the force, ‘Lack of professionalisation and 
standardisation of the discipline’ and ‘Negotiation as a Cinderella role’. 
Dual role conflict.  HCNs are on-call alongside their normal role duties, which 
inevitably means that they are deployed at some point during their “normal” working hours.  
Most interviewees [n = 14] stated that this caused difficulties: “…when the negotiator job 
conflicts with your day-to-day deadlines, which sometimes you can’t miss… it’s really hard” 
(C:F:2:96).  One interviewee referred to this as a form of “role corruption” (F:M:4:111) that 
resulted in stress from trying to manage the two roles simultaneously: “I do get called out, and 
it can be more than once a night… then I’ve got… kidnapping/extortion cover.  And all my 
force nights cover for a full tour of duties, for a week… and then you’ve got your own job to 
do” (O:F:9:36).  One interviewee referred to having to keep “spinning those plates” in terms 
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of the “double hatting” they perform (E:M:3:114); and others made reference to tension caused 
within the workplace/conflict with their superiors/managers: 
…being instructed to something else such as a negotiator incident that is not necessarily 
in your immediate line manager’s area of responsibility, depending on how long you’re 
away for, can be… not positively viewed… When you get called out in the middle of 
the night and you’re not available to come in the following day because you’ve been 
up all night, they have to try and find somebody to try and backfill (E:M:3:114). 
Lack of awareness and support within the force.  Although every UK police force has a cadre 
of HCNs and force policy dictates that HCNs are consulted and deployed in certain situations 
(e.g. firearms incidents) (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] et al., 2011), most 
interviewees [n = 9] referred to a general lack of awareness about the role: “…there’s still… a 
lack of understanding about what it [negotiation] is.  Some people… watch it on Hollywood 
blockbuster movies and think, that looks the business that does, but the reality is somewhat 
different” (L:M:7:54).  This included a lack of recognition amongst colleagues about the 
benefit of utilising HCNs and a lack of budgetary support from the force that amalgamated to 
produce an overall feeling of a lack of organisational understanding, awareness and support.  
This was described by some [n = 4] as having a direct impact on the utilisation and deployment 
of HCNs, whereby control room staff either failed to deploy them when needed, or deployed 
them when it was not appropriate to do so: 
…on occasions we do miss incidents that a negotiator should have been called… and… 
that’s not critical against one particular person, it’s just the realities of life that 
sometimes there’s quite a lot of changeover, into the control rooms, and some people 
won’t be aware of the fact that there’s negotiators and what… role they carry out…  
(A:M:1:156). 
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Lack of standardisation and professionalisation of the discipline.  Protocol in terms of 
how HCNs should be selected, deployed, quality assured and supported differed across forces, 
and was dependent on force ethos, policies and procedures (and to some extent the attitudes of 
the Chief Constable and Force HCN Lead).  This was described by some [n = 5] as problematic 
as it often meant that HCNs were operating differently across forces.  Some interviewees 
suggested a need for the selection processes to be nationally standardised and for assessors to 
be appropriately trained: “…you are using assessors who are assessing new candidates who 
might not be… quality assured… you know, not trained… They’re just… negotiators” 
(C:F:2:96).  Another commented on the lack of standardisation across the training courses 
which he felt was potentially problematic: “…I think we need the regional courses to be 
standardised… and I think there needs to be some clarity about whether or not they are a course 
which feeds into the national [course] or not” (K:M:2:111).  One interviewee also felt that 
courses would benefit from having an internally and externally validated accredited status in 
order to enhance professionalisation of the discipline, and that HCNn should be standardised 
in line with other police specialisms (i.e. firearms and public order) (A:M:1:156). 
…it’s mandated… now that if you… become a detective or if you become a PCSO, that 
you’ll be trained to national standards and they will be assessed, so it’s all quality 
assured and there’s internal verification, and there’s external verification, it’s all 
professionalised.  I think that’s a good thing, and that would be the one thing… there 
should be in place for negotiators (B:M:2:195). 
There were also discrepancies in the way that HCNs recorded their deployment 
activities across different forces; however, work was being done to try and rectify this issue: “I 
was lucky enough to go last week to the national negotiator group and talk about trying to 
standardise… data returns following deployment” (E:M:3:114) and since the data were 
collected changes have been implemented in terms of establishing a centrally organised 
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database for all UK police forces to record deployments using the same standardised electronic 
deployment form.   
Negotiation as a Cinderella role.  In the majority of forces (with the exception of a 
couple of metropolitan forces), the HCN role is a voluntary one that is performed alongside, or 
in addition to, officer day-to-day police roles.  The specifics of remuneration differ from force 
to force, with some HCNs receiving no financial remuneration, others receiving some form of 
small additional payment and others receiving payment in terms of “overtime” if they were 
below an Inspector rank.  HCNn was frequently referred to as a “Cinderella role” or a 
“Cinderella service”; phrases that are used within police circles to describe a 
voluntary/additional role that is perceived as being less important and less valued than other 
police specialisms.   
Most interviewees [n = 11] referred to the lack of tangible recognition and financial 
remuneration and specified that it would be nice to receive some (or more) remuneration in 
recognition for their services.  Some [n = 5] also felt undervalued/unappreciated by the force 
(particularly the management), despite feeling that they were performing a vital role that often 
involved deploying when they were off duty and during unsociable hours: “…there was a 
reward payment that some officers get… And we never, ever got that payment, and it was just 
left to us doing it down to good will… So I don’t think up that level we get appreciated” 
(C:F:2:96).  One interviewee described the thanks for doing the role as “intermittent” 
(E:M:3:114) and another stated “I don’t think the force recognises negotiators much at all…” 
(G:M:4:123).  Others described the disappointment they felt in association with the lack of 
substantive recognition received from their superiors: “There could be… some better reward 
and recognition for us…”  (B:M:2:195).   
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HCNn was also consistently referred to as a specialism that was considered to be a 
lower priority within the ‘pecking order’ of police specialist areas; with one interviewee 
describing it as the “poor relative” (H:F:5:50) in relation to other specialisms/specialist 
divisions.  This perception was linked by some [n = 4] to the limited budgetary support 
provided by the force: “…because it’s almost an add-on, it’s not something that the force 
thinks, right, this… is a priority… So, therefore, we get a smaller budget” (N:F:8:34).  The fact 
that HCNn is performed alongside officers’ core responsibilities meant that HCNs were unable 
to dedicate themselves fully to the role and it was often perceived as a “secondary function” 
(L:M:7:54) or a “bolt-on” (E:M:3:114) to their day jobs.  It was described by one interviewee 
as an “extracurricular activity” (F:M:4:111) and by another as a “hobby” (A:M:1:156) and 
interviewees gave the impression that their HCN role did not always dovetail neatly with their 
core policing role: “It’s an adjunct to our everyday duties, it doesn’t fit well, at all...” 
(F:M:4:111). 
Personal sacrifices.  Most interviewees [n = 11] described experiencing some form of 
personal sacrifice arising from the on-call commitments, unsociable hours and urgency of 
deployment, and two tertiary categories were identified within this category: ‘Disruption to 
family life’ and ‘Impact on personal and social life’.  
Disruption to family life.  HCNs often have to “walk out of the door and leave family 
commitments behind” (I:M:6:84) and some [n = 7] described difficulties associated with 
having to renege on family commitments.  Others referred to the negative feelings associated 
with disturbing family members when they were deployed: “…there’s personal difficulties… 
you know, disturbing the family’s sleep as I’m coming and going” (G:M:4:123) and the feeling 
of letting family members down due to not being able to “go anywhere or do anything” 
(J:F:6:110) as a result of being on call: “I’ve been in town with my family… having a meal, 
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and having to… put them in a taxi and then go off to… help somebody out.  So huge… I don’t 
think there’s anything that recognises the impact on the individuals” (F:M:4:111). 
Impact on personal and social life.  Some interviewees [n = 5] described the adverse 
impact on their social lives, whereby they would often not be able to consume alcohol or would 
have to turn down offers to socialise to ensure that they were safe to drive if deployed to an 
incident: “…when you’re on call, no we can’t go to that party, no we can’t go outside the force, 
I’ve got to stay dry” (G:M:4:123).  The role was, therefore, conceptualised as one which 
restricted them socially and negatively impacted on their personal/social life: “It’s a huge 
demand on you… and it impacts on your personal life… when you’re on call.  All your mates 
are down the pub and you’re sat watching East Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish” 
(L:M:7:54). 
Negotiation ambivalences.  The final primary category related to elements of the HCN 
experience that contained aspects with both positive and negative polarisations.  The 
‘Negotiator ambivalences’ category contained two secondary categories which are discussed 
below: ‘Negotiator stress/eustress’ and ‘The evolution of negotiation as an entity’.     
Negotiator stress/eustress.  Despite having to perform a highly challenging role that 
often involved dealing with life or death situations, HCNs tended to display an air of 
ambivalence about “stress” experienced in this context.  Not only were there contradictions in 
terms of HCNs experiencing or not experiencing stress; the stress experienced was also 
explained in somewhat contradictory terms, thereby demonstrating ambivalence on two levels.  
Some interviewees [n = 5] felt that negotiation was not stressful; whereas others (n = 10) 
reported having experienced stress during their role (albeit in different forms).  The latter group 
tended to either conceptualise stress in the form of “eustress”2 whereby they felt that HCNn 
                                                          
2 Eustress (n.d.) is defined as “moderate or normal psychological stress interpreted as being beneficial for the 
experiencer”.  
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provided them with a challenge that often resulted in a combination of both positive (eustress) 
and negative stress, or described the emotions associated with negotiating as “a different type 
of stress”, somehow lessening the perceived impact of this stress. 
Negotiation as non-stressful.  One third of interviewees [n = 5] felt that the role did not 
cause them to experience any form of stress.  Some were fairly “matter-of-fact” about this: 
“Well, I don’t personally get any stress from doing the negotiating stuff…” (N:F:8:34) and 
others provided fairly succinct answers with little elaboration:  IV: “Do you ever kind of 
experience stress or anxiety as a result of actually negotiating?” IE: “I haven’t so far” 
(M:F:8:24).  One interviewee described a process of reflection that he often went through after 
an incident had been resolved, which sometimes resulted in him questioning his actions and 
reflecting upon whether he could have responded differently, but was adamant that this process 
did not cause him any stress: “No… I don’t feel stressed” (O:F:9:36).  Another related the lack 
of stress he experienced to the confidence in his ability to negotiate or act as a HNC at an 
incident, implying that confidence plays a role in stress perception for some HCNs:   
…I don’t feel any stress when I’m negotiating; I really don’t.  I know the tactic that I 
want to employ; I know the route I want to go down or I want to direct my team down… 
so I don’t feel any stress when I’m either negotiating or supervising the team (I:M:6:84).  
Negotiator eustress.  Some reported experiencing stress but tended to conceptualise this 
as “eustress” as opposed to conventional “stress”, thereby giving it a positive rather than a 
negative connotation/polarisation.  For some [n = 3], negotiation was conceptualised as a 
challenge, as opposed to something that caused stress per se: “…it’s different.  No, it’s a 
challenge.  It’s not a stress… No, I wouldn’t say it was stressful” (C:F:2:96); and for others [n 
= 3], they felt that the role involved the manifestation of a combination of both negative and 
positive stress; with the positive stress often counteracting the effects of the negative stress:    
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…yes, I do [experience stress].  So you’re putting yourself on offer.  But equally there’s 
the argument to say that in the vast majority of situations when the matter’s resolved, 
you’re getting a lot of positive stress, so it’s like a blooming cup… you’ve got a load 
of negative here, but the potential is it’s actually all going to be smiles (A:M:1:156). 
Negotiation as a “different type of stress”.  HCNs frequently encountered highly 
pressurised situations that involved high-risk decision-making with a potential risk of harm or 
fatality to those involved.  These types of scenario would typically induce stress within most 
individuals, however, the experience was consistently conceptualised by most interviewees [n 
= 10] as being “different” to the stress experienced within other domains of their lives.  Some 
[n = 3] described the stress experienced from negotiating as less intense/severe than the stress 
experienced in their day jobs:  
“…somewhat perversely, I think although negotiating is always a crisis… I don’t find 
that it stresses me out really as much as the frustrations of any day-to-day… issues that 
you might come across.  Poor leadership and poor management really stresses me 
out…” (B:M:2:195). 
Whereas others [n = 3] felt the reverse: 
…absolutely poles apart… my everyday life… at work, is busy.  It’s not at all stressful, 
not in comparison with some of the bits that I do… I’ve been in far more stressful 
situations, with people throwing knives at me… and bottles at me, while I’m trying to 
talk them out of a situation… (G:M:4:123). 
And some [n = 2] felt that the stress was different but equal in terms of intensity: “I don’t think 
one is greater than the other, I think it’s just a totally different dynamic” (L:M:7:54).  These 
disparities are likely to reflect individual differences between HCNs, whereby they perceive 
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and respond to stress differently in line with their experiences and individual coping 
mechanisms.   
Negotiation was also conceptualised as different as a result of the intensity and duration 
of the stress experienced.  Some [n = 4] described the stress as intense but short-lived.  This 
high intensity, low duration (i.e. acute as opposed to chronic) stress was utilised as a 
justification for the stress not having too much of an impact on them in terms of their emotional 
wellbeing and functioning:   
It’s a different kind of stress really… Being a negotiator is stressful at the time you are 
doing the negotiation, but… realistically, I deal with fifteen to twenty incidents a year, 
whereby I deploy… how many of those are over fairly quickly… probably another half 
again.  So I’m talking about three or four that can become… very emotionally intense, 
difficult, long running (E:M:3:114). 
The evolution of negotiation as an entity was discussed in light of a range of HCN 
experience/service levels (2-16 years).  Interviewee reflections were painted in a combination 
of both positive and negative lights, with some feeling that changes had had a positive impact 
on the discipline and others feeling that the changes were potentially detrimental.  This category 
was further subdivided into three tertiary sub-categories which are discussed below: ‘Changes 
in deployment nature and frequency’, ‘The impact of Taser on negotiation deployment’ and 
‘Broader use of communication media within negotiation’.       
Changes in deployment nature and frequency were reported by interviewees, 
particularly those with longer service [n = 7].  A minority [n = 2] felt that they were now dealing 
with a broader range of deployments and some [n = 7] also felt that the type of incident they 
typically responded to had changed in terms of situational characteristics.  Interviewees 
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exemplified this with reference to more involvement with missing persons (MISPERs) and 
public order work (i.e. protests/marches/demonstrations).   
…I think it’s changed in that we’ve… tried to promote ourselves as, if you need 
anything for MISPERs and the like… people that you feel are in crisis, it might be a 
telephone call as opposed to that come out and do a face-to-face... (J:F:6:110). 
HCNs also described acting as “protest liaison officers” (N:F:8:34) in planned 
protests/demonstrations/marches to establish rules of engagement with the protest organisers 
and ensure that the protest remains peaceful:   
If we’ve got… a group we know are going to come and protest in a particular area, and 
we fear there’s going to be an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that 
protest, then, increasingly, we’re getting negotiators involved in that to try and 
facilitate… a better outcome for all parties (D:M:3:63). 
There is no doubt that the skills possessed by HCNs can be utilised in a broad variety 
of settings and it may be that their skills are being underutilised.  One interviewee referred to 
the potential use of HCNs as “in-force mediators to mediate for conflict resolutions” 
(A:M:1:156), an idea which may gain momentum in the future.  Despite a perceived increase 
in breadth of deployment, there was also a strong feeling amongst some interviewees [n = 6] 
that the number and frequency of deployments had decreased: “…there’s an anecdotal feeling 
that it’s dropped off a bit… anecdotally, it always felt like it was… two or three calls a week, 
I’d get… now, one or two, and sometimes… I’ve had some weeks with no calls, at all” 
(F:M:4:111). 
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The impact of Taser on negotiation deployment.  Taser3 was introduced in 2004 for use 
by authorised firearms officers (AFOs) and was extended to use by specially trained units in 
2008 (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2013).  “Taser provides an additional 
option to resolve situations, including the threat of violence, which can come from any section 
of the public” (Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2013) and is used as an alternative 
to other physical tactical options, such as physical restraint, and the use of police dogs or 
batons.  Interviewees felt that this had a direct impact on the nature and frequency of their 
deployment, with almost half [n = 7] reporting a decrease in the number of call outs they 
received: “So with the advent of Taser, that’s seen a reduction in the number of negotiating 
incidents, because the police officers at the scene are able to deal with it adequately, quickly, 
and safely by the use of Taser” (A:M:1:156).  Some [n = 5] also reported a change in the nature 
of their deployments: “so without a doubt, there are some… types of job, which are on the 
decrease” (G:M:4:123); whereby they were less likely to be deployed to barricade or domestic 
siege scenarios because Taser was seen as a quicker (and sometimes more efficient/cheaper) 
solution to this type of incident (as opposed to a potentially lengthy and protracted negotiation): 
“…two minutes after we arrive, he’s been zapped, and he’s subdued, and that’s the end of it” 
(F:M:4:111). 
Broader use of communication media within negotiation.  Historically, HCNn has 
generally been conducted face-to-face or voice-to-voice (via telephone); however, advances in 
communication technology have resulted in HCNs (n = 5) utilising a variety of different 
communication methods, including text message, email and social networking sites (SNSs) in 
addition to the traditional methods of communication.  HCNs have had to “move with the 
                                                          
3 The Taser (conducted energy device) is a single shot device designed to temporarily incapacitate a subject 
through use of an electrical current which temporarily interferes with the body’s neuromuscular system (College 
of Policing, 2014a). 
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times” in order to communicate with individuals in crisis, particularly those of the younger 
generation who are more likely to engage in text messaging or chatting on SNSs.       
As we sit here now, there’s probably… maybe half a dozen high-risk missing persons 
in [anonymised location] alone… A lot of those… we could have an intervention with 
them by a phone call.  Or a text… Remember some of the technology’s changed as 
well.  I’ve found that I’ve ended up carrying out part of negotiations via text… Email… 
Facebook… all of that is a massive change from when I started certainly (B:M:2:195). 
One interviewee (K:M:2:111) also referred to electronic communication being 
perceived as  providing individuals who are committing a crime with a form of anonymity, 
whereby extortionists may believe that their actions are less traceable as a result of email (as 
opposed to telephone) communication.  He referred specifically to an increase in deployment 
to/involvement with extortion/sextortion cases involving threats to disclose personally 
damaging information via the internet and indicated that HCNs were now having to work with 
cases that solely involved communication via electronic/digital media:  
Yes, we’re finding more of those internet-related now where people are engaging in 
sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then… This film’s going to be 
released; it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account… So you’re 
getting those types of jobs now, which we haven’t seen before (K:M:2:111). 
Discussion 
This model provides a unique insight into the experiences of police HCNs from an 
operational, professional and personal perspective.  The findings present valuable opportunities 
for organisational learning and have enabled the authors to make various recommendations for 
changes to HCN policy and practice that are discussed below (and synopsised within Table 1).  
To begin with, it is clear that being a HCN can be an incredibly positive experience, with the 
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discipline being perceived as both personally and professionally rewarding.  Some HCNs 
identified the role as being their core reason for coming to work, thereby further attesting to 
the rewarding nature of the role for some officers.  Others identified the rewards associated 
with the HCN role as being unique to the discipline and these findings highlight the benefits 
and added value that HCNs felt as a result of being part of the cadre.  These findings provide 
justification for the existence of the HCN role, which is mutually beneficial, both for subjects 
who are in crisis/conflict and the HCNs whose job it is to resolve these situations.  As such, 
aspects of the model could be used within recruitment strategies as a means of 
promoting/encouraging officers to apply for the role. 
In contrast, the negatives identified indicate that there is scope for improvement within 
the discipline, allowing a number of recommendations to be made in relation to HCN policy 
and practice.  A number of recommendations relate to the concept of “awareness raising” in 
relation to the HCNn discipline.  Firstly, it would be prudent to try to differentiate the roles of 
HCN/commander more clearly by educating and training non-HCN staff on the HCN role and 
remit.  Such training may help to avoid operational rank/role conflict on scene (i.e., to ensure 
that both parties stick to the “negotiators negotiate and commanders command rule”).  Wind 
(1995) clarified the role of the field commander in critical incidents and Noesner (1999) 
addressed negotiation concepts for commanders, thereby identifying similar conflict issues that 
have been dealt with in the USA.  Similar methods could be introduced in the UK to help 
enhance the operational efficiency of HCN deployments and avoid rank/role conflict issues in 
the future.   
Secondly, raising awareness of the benefits of using HCNs within the firearms ‘world’ 
and trying to educate firearms commanders/teams in terms of why HCNs play the “long game” 
and how negotiation can successfully resolve situations without the need for tactical 
intervention, may be beneficial.  A similar approach has been suggested by Vecchi (2002) in 
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the USA, whereby the potential for conflict is likely to be reduced by acknowledging the 
importance and legitimacy of both HCN and firearms teams and fostering relationships 
between them.  One way of facilitating this relationship would be for both teams to train 
together on a regular basis, to enhance intra-team and cross-discipline (i.e. inter-team) working 
and relationships.  
Thirdly, the authors suggest that there is a need to raise awareness of the HCN role 
within forces generally, and that internal “public relations and marketing” associated with the 
role could be enhanced so that control room operators and duty inspectors are aware of the 
benefit of utilising HCNs and the appropriate incidents in which to deploy them.  Part of this 
could also involve training first responders/uniformed officers in terms of the HCNn 
procedures/protocol (and in particular highlighting the importance of scene 
control/maintenance of a sterile environment).  Overall, greater internal publicising of the work 
that HCNs do may also help to enhance awareness of the role within the force and to encourage 
financial and general support for HCNs. 
There is also scope for organisational change when considering 
remuneration/recognition for HCNs.  Whilst it may not be financially possible/feasible to 
enhance the financial remuneration HCNs receive, the findings indicate that it is recognition 
and feeling valued by the organisation that are perceived as more important forms of 
remuneration by HCNs themselves.  Enhancing recognition of the work that HCNs do, by 
superiors acknowledging the number of incidents that the cadre have successfully resolved on 
an annual basis may be one way to do this.  Annual provision of a certificate for individual 
HCNs would also allow them to keep a formal record of their deployments and could be utilised 
within appraisal/personal development procedures.  Simply raising awareness of the nature of 
the role (and the work that HCNs do on top of their daily tasks) within the higher echelons of 
the organisation may help to encourage the greater recognition and remuneration that is desired 
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by HCNs.  Increased internal recognition of the importance of the role and greater appreciation 
of the work that HCNs do would also help to negate some of the personal sacrifices that HCNs 
make when performing the role.   
In a similar vein, better budgetary support would help HCNs to feel valued and 
supported within their role.  Whilst this does not necessarily mean increased individual 
financial remuneration, the provision of an increased budget would allow cadres to be provided 
with appropriate equipment (i.e. clothing, recording equipment etc.) and it would also enable 
greater opportunities for HCNs to undergo CPD and/or specific training events which are likely 
to have a positive impact on their negotiation performance.  Similarly, whilst it is not feasible 
to suggest that all HCNs be employed in a full-time capacity in the UK, increasing awareness, 
recognition and remuneration for HCNs would go some way to alleviate the negativities 
associated with HCNn being viewed as a “Cinderella service”.  Without HCNs, there is no 
doubt that many individuals would die, or be seriously injured.  On this basis, it is 
commonsensical to suggest that the role should be given more credence within the policing 
arena and HCNs should be credited more highly for the work that they do.   
From an operational perspective, there is evidence to suggest that HCNs function best 
and manage stress more effectively when they have a connection to their team and their peers 
(Greenstone, 2004), with a suggestion that the primary and secondary HCN model typically 
utilised, acts as a strong stress management tool (Norton and Petz, 2012).  When considering 
this in line with the current findings, they suggest that attempts should be made to ensure that 
HCNs are deployed in pairs (where logistically possible) and that the length of time that 
primary HCNs are negotiating on their own is minimised so as to reduce the pressure/stress 
experienced as a result of “negotiating solo”.  Such efforts would ensure that HCNs are 
provided with the best possible environment in which to perform their role.         
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There is also scope to enhance both professionalisation and standardisation of the 
discipline in a number of ways.  Firstly, standardisation of the procedures that are utilised to 
recruit, select, train and support HCNs is warranted.  This would involve ensuring that selection 
criteria and training processes are standardised across all forces.  It would also involve ensuring 
that all HCNs receive a standardised accredited training course, which is (ideally) accredited 
by an external institution/organisation, to ensure that both regional and national training 
courses are working to the same curriculum.  Similarly, standardisation of the deployment logs 
and recording processes would allow for better empirical comparison of deployments and ergo 
enable a statistical/epidemiological picture of the nature and extent of UK HCNn to be 
developed.  A standardisation of the HCN deployment recording process has, in fact, recently 
been implemented, with an electronically managed secure online platform now being used by 
the majority of the 43 forces in the UK ensuring that all HCN deployments are recorded in the 
same standardised manner.  This development has now resulted in the first centrally managed 
National Negotiator Deployment Database of its kind internationally.  Unlike the well-known 
HOBAS database managed by the FBI in the US, the UK-based database contains data 
pertaining to all HCN deployments (and is therefore not subjected to the criticisms associated 
with bias and self-selected recording that has previously plagued the HOBAS system).  The 
standardisation of deployment recording will have immense benefits to the discipline as a result 
of being able to inform the training and CPD of HCNs using an evidence base (thereby meeting 
the needs of the requirement for more emphasis on evidence-based policing, as suggested by 
the College of Policing (2014b) Five Year Strategy document). 
Findings in relation to the negotiation ambivalences category suggest that the discipline 
of HCNn has evolved over the past ten-fifteen years and is likely to evolve further in the future.  
As such, HCNs need to be flexible in terms of adapting to the ever changing ‘terrain’ that they 
may be exposed to, facilitated via ongoing CPD that equips them to respond to evolving 
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incident characteristics.  They also need to be able to respond to subjects utilising a variety of 
different communication methods (i.e. text, email, social networking/chat) and would, 
therefore, benefit from bespoke training which addresses the use of said communication 
methods.  Lastly, it would be prudent to work with HCNs further in terms of identifying 
whether stress is an issue and whether resiliency training/bespoke coping skills training would 
be beneficial for some/all HCNs.  Grossman and Christiensen (2004, p. 35) referred to the 
concept of “stress inoculation” whereby “prior success under stressful conditions acclimatises 
you to similar situations and promotes future success”, suggesting that bespoke forms of stress 
inoculation training within the HCN context could be beneficial.  
Whilst the research questions addressed as part of this research aligned sympathetically 
with a qualitative research design, the findings are of course, somewhat limited by the fact that 
they are dependent on the interviewees’ memory/interpretation of experiences.  Similarly, it is 
worth bearing in mind that social desirability and impression management may have played a 
role within the realities presented by the interviewees.  When considering the concept of stress, 
for example, the police service has historically been perceived as having a macho culture 
(Chan, 1997; Reiner, 2010), whereby officers desire to be perceived as strong and efficient 
enforcers of the law.  This type of environment is, therefore, likely to play a role in whether an 
interviewee feels able to disclose feeling stressed within the workplace within an interview 
setting, and it may be that the experience of stress has been underreported as a result of this.   
It is also important to acknowledge the authors’ unique position in terms of being 
granted access to a population (i.e. police officers) that has historically been difficult to access 
by researchers (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997) and the fact that the lead researcher spent several 
years engaging with the research participants and fully immersing herself in the research 
process.  As a result of this, it is impossible to completely avoid personal bias (Tong, Sainsbury, 
& Craig, 2007), even though it may be both inadvertent and benevolent.  In order to pre-
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emptively counter/minimise the existence of bias, a number of techniques were utilised (as 
guided by Shenton, 2004 and Tong et al., 2007), including 1) participant validation of interview 
transcripts, 2) member checks/interviewee validation of developed models, 3) 
review/discussion of findings and models with co-authors (including a co-author who had 
previously worked as a HCN), and 4) scrutiny of the study’s findings by peers at conferences 
which enabled refinement of the model and strengthening of arguments.  Future research may 
also benefit from the inclusion of a pilot study which enables the interview schedule to be tested 
and refined and allows the researcher(s) to practice interview technique to ensure that the data 
collected within the study “proper” is as unbiased, rich and detailed as possible. 
Whilst the findings help to provide some initial insight into the world of HCNn and the 
HCN experience, additional research is required that triangulates the findings herein, using 
observation of live/training scenarios to enhance the overall credibility of the model developed.  
Similarly, it would be informative to examine the cross-cultural validity of the model.  An 
Anglo-American model, for example, that explores the potential similarities and differences in 
HCN experiences from both a professional and personal perspective, would help to understand 
whether the role has different meanings for UK/USA-based HCNs and identify whether HCNs 
in the USA experience the same difficulties from an organisational/operational context.  It may 
be, for example, that HCNs based in the US (who pioneered the discipline of HCNn) have 
developed more effective systems/protocols to deal with any ‘negotiation negatives’, and as 
such, may provide guidance that can be followed in the UK to enhance the HCN experience.  
Similarly, it may be that we can learn from other countries in terms of how to avoid/minimise 
the impact of any organisational/operational issues by exploring HCN experiences within a 
variety of individualistic (i.e. western) and collectivist (i.e. non-western) cultures.  Research in 
this vein may eventually help to enhance the efficacy of HCNn as a police tool, by helping us 
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to understand the role more fully and to utilise the experiences of those who perform the role 
to enhance evidence-based policing within the HCNn arena. 
The current model provides a unique “snap-shot” into the lives of police officers who 
perform a complex but vital task in order to save the lives of individuals involved in hostage 
or crisis scenarios.  The findings provide insight into a previously un-researched area and have 
been utilised to highlight potential organisational learning and make a number of 
recommendations relating to HCN practice and policy that will hopefully benefit both HCNs 
and police organisations alike.  
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Table 1   
Table Synopsising the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Categories within the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model and Implications for 
Organisational Learning, Policy and Practice  
Primary categories Secondary categories Tertiary categories Implications for organisational learning/HCN policy and practice 
Negotiation 
positives 
The negotiator family Cadre as supportive Could be used to enhance PR in relation to HCNn and encourage 
recruitment of trainee HCNs 
  Camaraderie and comradeship Could be used to enhance PR in relation to HCNn and encourage 
recruitment of trainee HCNs 
  Negotiation as a team discipline Could be used to highlight importance of team fit and team work 
within HCN trainee selection policies/training programmes  
 Negotiation as personally and 
professionally rewarding 
Negotiation as challenging Could be used to encourage recruitment of trainee HCNs and 
promote the benefits of the role internally 
  Opportunity for public interface and 
interaction 
Could be used to encourage recruitment of trainee HCNs and 
promote the benefits of the role internally to officers with more 
managerial positions and less operational policing roles (i.e. 
high-ranking officers/training staff etc.) 
  Negotiation as emotionally rewarding Could be used to enhance PR in relation to HCNn and encourage 
recruitment of trainee HCNs 
  Feeling good from helping others Could be used to enhance PR in relation to HCNn and encourage 
recruitment of trainee HCNs 
Negotiation 
negatives 
Operational issues Operational rank/role conflict Could be used to educate/train police personnel and raise 
awareness (including those performing command duties) in 
relation to the HCN role/remit 
  Lack of operational discipline Could be used to educate/train front line officers in relation to 
the importance of operational discipline when in attendance at 
HCN incidents 
  Competing tactical orientations Could be used to educate firearms officers/commanders in 
relation to the reasons for the HCN approach (i.e. the “long 
game”) and to encourage better team work from HCNs/AFOs 
  Negotiating solo Could be used to inform policy relating to HCN deployment and 
avoid solo deployment 
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 Organisational issues Dual role conflict  Could be used to educate senior managers/raise awareness of the 
importance of HCNs/the HCN role to help minimise dual role 
conflict 
  Lack of awareness and support within the 
force 
Could be used to educate/train police personnel (i.e. call 
handlers/control room operators/duty inspectors) in relation to 
the importance of the HCN role and encourage appropriate 
deployment of HCNs 
  Lack of standardisation and 
professionalisation of the discipline 
Could be used to inform policy in relation to HCNn as a police 
discipline (i.e. standardised recording of deployments and 
standardised delivery of accredited training) 
  Negotiation as a Cinderella role Could be used to promote the importance of HCNs internally 
(i.e. enhance internal PR) and promote the work that they do to 
save lives 
 Personal sacrifices Disruption to family life Could be used to demonstrate the commitment that HCNs make 
in order to help others – this could help to enhance internal 
recognition/promote remuneration for HCNs  
  Impact on personal/social life Could be used to demonstrate the commitment that HCNs make 
in order to help others – this could help to enhance internal 
recognition/promote remuneration for HCNs 
Negotiation 
ambivalences 
Negotiator stress/eustress Negotiation as non-stressful Could be used to inform future research to explore the role of 
stress within HCN practice further  
  Negotiator eustress Could be used to inform future research to explore the role of 
stress within HCN/identify whether resilience/stress-inoculation 
training would be beneficial to HCNs  
  Negotiation as a “different type of stress” Could be used to inform future research to explore the role of 
stress within HCN/identify whether resilience/stress-inoculation 
training would be beneficial to HCNs 
 The evolution of negotiation as 
an entity 
Changes in deployment frequency and 
nature 
Could be used to inform policy relating to standardisation of 
deployments to enable research to be performed to measure 
trends/patterns in deployment frequency/nature 
  Impact of Taser on negotiation 
deployment 
Could be used to inform discussions about appropriate use of 
Taser and inform policy if necessary 
  Broader use of communication mediums 
within negotiation 
Could be used to highlight the importance of CPD/training to 
ensure HCNs are equipped to deal with evolving incident 
characteristics and communication technology  
 
